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This paper investigates online knowledge sharing behaviour in Baidu Knows, a platform sponsored by 
the largest search engine company Baidu in China. We developed a spider engine to collect data from 
over 2 million questions posted at Baidu Knows. The data collected allows us to profile registered 
members, to answer questions such as who are the main driving force of those online communities and 
their attributes, and who are the free-riders seldom posting and answering questions. We also test several 
hypotheses in explaining the motivations of knowledge sharing, and the quality of such knowledge 
sharing. Our results indicate that there is a large proportion of users who seldom answer questions, but 
always ask questions. Although their behaviour seems selfish at the surface, they are actually the key 





















Online communities are virtual spaces on the Internet where a group of people of similar interests 
communicate and interact collectively or individually to achieve certain goals. Its popularity has grown 
tremendously in recent years that in many instances online communities have become one of the main 
resources of knowledge seeking.  The most famous and successful example is Wiki, the largest free 
encyclopedia in the world, where anyone can access its web pages to contribute or modify content. 
However, as its name indicates, the Wiki website is only useful for acquiring information about well-
established encyclopedic subjects and thus lacks the flexibility for knowledge seeking of more general 
and practical types. 
  
The model of seeking general and practical knowledge on the Internet has evolved substantially over 
years. Previously, Internet users actively sought knowledge via search engines, such as Google and 
Yahoo!. However, the search efficiency highly relies on the selection of keywords. Also the information 
obtained tends to be fragmented, incomplete and may even be wrong sometimes. When users are 
unfamiliar with the subject matter, or choose inappropriate keywords, the knowledge seeking process 
tends to be quite inefficient. 
 
The broad class of Web 2.0 technologies attempts to improve upon the search process by establishing a 
passive way of acquiring knowledge. In this model, users can propose questions in virtual communities, 
and expect answers provided by other users. Once they find the right place in the knowledge sharing 
platform to post their questions, the rest is left for others to contribute answers. The questions range from 
highly specialized technical questions to everyday practical questions. Interestingly, in large knowledge 
sharing platforms, such as Yahoo! Answers and Baidu Knows, millions of online users are active in the 




Launched in June of 2005, Baidu Knows is China’s largest knowledge sharing platform. In Baidu Knows, 
the questions proposed by users are classified into over 500 categories at the time of this research, which 
are still increasing at a rapid pace everyday. Over 23.3 million questions and 22.8 million answers have 
been posted by the end of 2007. As a platform that was established only 2 years ago, Baidu Knows’ 
phenomenal success arguably plays an important role in Baidu’s competition with Google in the search 
engine arena in the Chinese Internet.  
 
The success of the knowledge sharing platforms begs two important questions. First, why do people 
devote their time and effort to sharing their knowledge in virtual communities helping others, and who are 
they? Second, what is the quality of the answers provided and how useful are they? Obviously without the 
quantity and the quality of the answers, the usefulness of the knowledge sharing platform would dissipate, 
ultimately leading to reduced hit rates.  
 
Despite the phenomenal growth of online knowledge sharing communities, there is surprisingly little 
empirical research about actual knowledge sharing patterns. Most prior studies use survey methods to 
investigate users’ knowledge sharing motivation. New online knowledge sharing communities enable a 
new way of knowledge sharing: users freely propose their questions and exchange opinions with 
members. However, the technology infrastructure alone cannot guarantee meaningful and constructive 
knowledge sharing behavior (Alavi and Leidner 1999). Its survival totally depends upon the “kindness of 
strangers” as previously suggested (Constant et al. 1996). This is in sharp contrast to conventional 
communities, where the main factors driving knowledge sharing are identified as strong ties (Wellman 
and Wortley 1990), co-location (Allen 1984, Kraut et al. 1990), demographic similarities (Pelled 1996), 
and status similarities (Cohen and Zhou 1991). However, Wasko and Faraj (2005) argue that these factors 
are not applicable in virtual communities, where participants are typically strangers, and do not always 
have demographic or status similarities.  
 
                                              
1 Baidu is the largest search engine company in China. 
Then why do people spend their valuable time and effort to contribute knowledge helping others? Prior 
studies postulated a variety of theories explaining knowledge contributions. Social capital is typically 
defined as “resources embedded in a social structure that are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive 
action” (Lin 2001, p. 29). Wasko and Faraj (2005) identified three forms of social capital related to 
knowledge sharing behavior in electronic networks. Chiu et al. (2006) also identified the influence of 
social capital on individual’s willingness to share knowledge. Another theory concerns the collective 
action. Wasko and Faraj (2005) theorized that in online communities, individuals voluntarily contribute 
their time, effort, and knowledge toward the collective benefits. Intrinsic benefits such as self-worth, 
social norm, social affiliation, and extrinsic benefits such as economic rewards, future promotion 
opportunities, can drive knowledge contributions (Ma and Agarwal 2007, Bock et al. 2005, Kankanhalli 
et al.2005). Donath (1999) investigated Usenet newsgroup and concluded that identity plays a vital role in 
knowledge sharing behavior. The identity definition includes both the establishment of their own 
reputation and the recognition by others. 
 
In this paper, we address knowledge sharing issues with empirical data collected from a spider engine that 
we developed. The data enables us to build a profile of those who post questions and those who answer 
questions. This allows us to address questions such as how many users are free-riders who seldom share 
their own knowledge while only asking questions, and who are the main contributors who are the driving 
force of the community? What are their main attributes, and whether knowledge sharing in different 
information categories exhibits different sharing patterns? With respect to the answer quality issue, we 
established a simple regression model to investigate the correlation between the quality of knowledge 
sharing and the characteristics of those who contribute knowledge. By analyzing users’ true knowledge 
sharing behavior, this study sheds light on how to induce, promote, and manage online knowledge sharing 
behavior. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the spider engine and the data collection 
effort, followed by a profile analysis of different classes of users. Section 3 tests several hypotheses of 
different behavior among user groups in motivating knowledge sharing. Section 4 looks at the free-rider 
phenomenon. We also established a theoretical model that investigates the correlation between answer 
quality and the characteristics of those who contribute answers in section 5. Section 6 contains concluding 
remarks.   
2. USER PROFILE ANALYSIS 
To collect field data, we choose from two of the largest knowledge sharing platforms in the world, Baidu 
Knows and Yahoo! Answers.
2
 Interestingly, these two platforms adopt different mechanisms of how to 
reward users’ sharing behavior. Yahoo! Answers makes each question have the same Reward Points as 
answerers. Once the question is answered, the best answerer will get the Reward Points, which are given 
by Yahoo! Answers. In Baidu Knows, in contrast, askers could choose how many points they want to pay, 
and the Reward Points are deducted from askers’ cumulative points. Compared with Yahoo! Answers, 
Baidu Knows seems to provide more flexibility in motivating knowledge sharing. The comparison of 
these two mechanisms in driving their respective growth would be an interesting subject, but we will 
leave this issue to another research paper in the future.  
 
We developed a spider engine to collect data in Baidu Knows as of December 2007.  First we identified 
users who have asked or answered questions in one week from our sample in Baidu Knows’ Computer 
and Entertainment categories. Overall, we got 2,763 questions and 7,520 answers, with each question 
having an average of 2.72 answers. For the Computer category, there were 1,383 questions and 3,417 
answers, averaging 2.47 answers per question. For the Entertainment category, there were 1,380 questions 
and 4,103 answers, averaging 2.97 answers per question. Detailed descriptive statistics of questions and 
answers are shown in the following Table 1: 
 
                                              
2 This version reports data from Baidu Knows. Data from Yahoo! Answers will be incorporated in a forthcoming version. 
 Computer Entertainment Overall 
No. of Questions 1383 1380 2763 
No. of Answers 3417 4103 7520 
Mean of No. of Answers for Each Question 2.47 2.97 2.71 
Median of No. of Answers for Each Question 2 2 2 
Std. Dev of No. of Answers for Each Question 0.06 0.07 0.05 
Minimum of No. of Answers for Each Question 0 0 0 
Maximum of No. of Answers for Each Question 26 24 26 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of No. of Answers for Each Question 
 
The collected data contains past information of each user ID, which specifies three variables: No. of 
Answers, Reward Point and Best Answer Ratio. For privacy concerns, Baidu does not provide 
information about how many questions each ID has asked. We then collect all the information about these 
three variables for each user ID. The exact definition of these three variables are as follows:  
 No. of Answers shows how many times each ID shared his or her knowledge with others. 
 Reward Point tells how many points won by answering others’ questions.  
 Best Answer Ratio is the ratio between the answers rated as the best answers by askers and the total 
number of questions one member answered.  
 
Each user ID’s past history of asking and answering questions allows us to enlarge the sample size to 
include 2,114,930 questions. Based on the profile of questions posted and answered, we classify all 
members into several categories: top contributors, casual contributors and non-registered free riders.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of all registered members. Data along the x axis in Figure 1 is rank-
ordered by the No. of Answers in the past, and the y axis is the No. of Answers provided by each 
corresponding registered member. These is clearly a concentration of users who often answered questions. 
Therefore we classify the top 10% of registered members as top contributors, who answered 1,618,161 
questions in total, accounting for 76.6% of the total questions. Casual contributors are those registered 
members who answer questions occasionally. They account for 90% of the registered members. There are 
clearly also non-registered members of online knowledge sharing communities outside our sample. We 
define them as non-registered members who only come to the website to view questions and answers 
without contributing anything. 
 
                               














Figure 1: Users’ Knowledge Sharing Pattern 
 
Past literature reports that knowledge contribution in Linux working groups follows a power distribution. 
Figure 1 seems to indicate the same pattern, as 10% of the members account for about three quaters of all 
answers. We test the power distribution for this dataset as well in SPSS. The power test is significant at 
99% level.  
 
 
Figure 2: Knowledge Sharing Pattern 
Figure 2 above illustrates the distribution of member segments as defined previously. One interesting fact 
about top contributors is that not only the quantity but also the quality of their answers is higher than 
others. The quality of shared knowledge is measured by Best Answer Ratio. For each question proposed 
in Baidu Knows, askers are required to select and mark one best answer, if possible, from all the answers 
proposed by other members. The profile of each member contains the Best Answer Ratio, which shows 
the percentage of answers that are rated as the best among all answers provided by each member. The 
average Best Answer Ratio of top contributors is 20.9%, which is much higher than the 12.5% average 
for the rest.
3
 This indicates that top contributors appear to be the driving force of the knowledge sharing 
communities. They answer about three quarters of the total questions, and one fifth of their answers have 
been selected as the best answer by askers. On average, each of them has answered 2,021 questions, 
which is quite astonishing considering the two year time span of our sample data. 
  
Interestingly, the data shows that top contributors can be further classified into two different subgroups by 
using the 1,000 Reward Points as the demarcation point. 85.3% of the top contributors’ Reward Points are 
less than 1,000, indicating that they asked less than 223 questions in the past. This is in sharp contrast to 
the 2,021 questions they answered. As a result, we call these members pure contributors, as they seem to 
be inclined to passing knowledge to others without expecting anything in return. 
 
The second group of top contributors not only answers many questions but is also active knowledge 
seekers by asking many questions. 14.7% of the top contributors’ Reward Points are higher than 1000, 
with the average at 2,619, which means that they asked 589 questions on average in the past. We call 
these members active contributors and knowledge seekers. On one hand, they are keen on sharing 
knowledge with others. On the other hand, they are also active knowledge seekers, who frequently 
propose questions and give high rewards to answerers. 
                                              
3 When we calculate the average Best Answer Ratio, we delete those members whose No. of Answer is less than 10. 
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Casual contributors are 90% of all registered members in the community. They answered 496,769 
questions, accounting for 23.5% of the total questions. Both the quantity and the quality of their shared 
knowledge are inferior to that from the top contributors. 
3. KNOWLEDGE SHARING MOTIVATIONS 
Social exchange theory states that members engage in social interaction based on the expectation that it 
will lead in some way to social rewards, such as approval, status, and respect (Blau 1964). Ma and 
Agarwal (2007) theorized that participants share knowledge in online communities for both extrinsic 
benefits and intrinsic benefits. Donath (1999) proposed that in Usenet newsgroups, identity, both the 
establishment of their own reputation and the recognition of others, plays a vital role. 
 
In knowledge sharing platforms, Reward Points could serve both as extrinsic award and intrinsic award. 
First, Reward Points act as the electronic money in the community. When members propose their 
questions, they need to pass some of their Reward Points to answerers.  Second, Reward Points indicate 
the status of the member. In Baidu Knows, members are classified into 18 levels. Once members have 
accumulated certain Reward Points, they could be promoted to a higher level, indicating that they are 
more knowledgeable and have higher willingness to help others. As a result, high Reward Points can help 
members move up to higher levels and receive more esteem from others.  This is hypothesis 1: 
 
H1: Members share knowledge because of extrinsic and intrinsic motivations.  The higher the Reward 
Points are associated with a question, the more answers it will get from others.   
 
To check whether the Reward Points assigned to a question are related to Number of Answers it is likely 
to solicit, we use nonparametric test: Pearson’s r, Spearman’s rho, and Kendall’s tau_b. The results are 
reported in Table 2: 
 
 Computer  Entertainment  Both Categories 
Pearson’s r 0.516*** 0.249*** 0.372*** 
Spearman’s rho 0.254*** 0.105*** 0.167*** 
Kendall’s tau_b 0.208*** 0.084*** 0.136*** 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
          Table 2.   Nonparametric correlation between Reward Points and No. of Answers 
Our results show that in both the Computer category and the Entertainment category, Reward Points are 
significantly correlated with No. of Answers.  The strength of correlation is higher in the Computer 
category than that in the Entertainment category.  Therefore, H1 is accepted. 
 
People are not only pragmatic but also expressive of feelings, values, and self-identities (Baudura 1986, 
Schlenker 1985, Shamir 1991). In knowledge sharing communities, members could increase self-worth, 
personal identification with the organization, self-respect, respect from others, and feelings of 
commitment by helping others. Bandura (1986) posited that self-evaluation based on competence and 
social acceptance is an important source of intrinsic motivation that drives engagement in activities for 
the sake of the activity itself, rather than for external rewards. Wasko and Faraj (2000) also demonstrated 
that members may contribute knowledge within the collective because solving problems is challenging or 
fun, and because helping others is enjoyable. Therefore, we may expect that enjoyment of helping is one 
of the main motivations for members’ contribution to the collective. 
 
In knowledge sharing platforms, some questions do not provide Reward Points to answerers.  If such 
questions are still answered by other members, we may expect that the answerers reply such questions not 
for Reward Points, but for the joy they achieved during the helping process. Therefore, we propose the 
hypothesis 2: 
 
H2: Some member share their knowledge because of the enjoyment of helping others.   
 
Overall, the Reward Points given out are very low. 47.86% of questions do not have any Reward Points. 
92.8% of questions have Reward Points less than 30. Only 3.3% of the questions have Reward Points 
higher than 100, the highest being 200. Those questions having zero Reward Points have on average 1.91 
answers, and only 17.8% of them are not answered. These results seem to indicate that some members are 
not motivated by extrinsic awards, but possibly by the enjoyment of helping others, thus confirming H2.  
  
Although exchanges in electronic social networks occur through weak ties between strangers, there is 
evidence of reciprocal supportiveness (Wellman and Gulia 1999).  In online communities, members tend 
to show generalized reciprocity. Scholars believe that in online communities with strong sharing social 
norms, members may offer their help either because that they may have been helped by others in the past 
or they may expect that some one in the community would help them if they have a question in the future. 
If reciprocal supportiveness is one motivation for members’ knowledge sharing behavior, a member’s 
helping tendency should be valued by others in the community. In other words, a member who used to 
help others should be more likely to get help from others compared with free riders. Therefore, we 
propose the following hypothesis 
 
H3: Members who shared their knowledge more frequently in the past will get more responses when they 
post their questions. 
 
We use the following regression function to check the correlation between members’ past answering 
behavior and the No. of answers they received when they propose their own questions. The result are 
reported in Table 3 
No. of Answers= Reward Points + Askers’ No. of Answers in History 
 
 Constant Reward Points No. of Answers in History 






 R Square=0.139 
F=222.152*** 
  
Computer Category 1.884(0.059) 
t =31.735*** 
0.04(0.002) 
t = 22.390*** 
0.00001(0.000) 
t = -0.802 




t = 35.865*** 
0.028(0.003) 
t = 9.555*** 
0.0001(0.000) 
t = 1.031 
 R Square=0.063 
F=46.152*** 
  
Table 3.   Regression Results for No. of Answers against Asker’s No., of Answers in History 
 
This regression results show that No. of Answers is correlated with Reward Point, which of course 
confirms H1. However, Askers’ No. of Answers in History is not significantly correlated with No. of 
Answers a qustion gets.  The result is quite important: members’ helping behavior does not pay off in 
terms of getting more answers when they need help in the future.  No. of Answers in History indicates 
how many times a user helped others and contributed his/her knowledge. When this user calls for help 
and posts questions, others do not seem to value the asker’s past behavior. That means, the conclusion 
that people help others due to reciprocal supportiveness motivation cannot be drawn in the Baidu Knows 
sample data, thus rejecting H3. 
 
When members ask for help in online communities, they usually send out their Reward Points to attract 
others to answer their questions. However, around half of the questions do not send out Reward Points 
and the askers can be viewed as free riders. Such phenomenon begs the question who tends to value more 
others’ knowledge sharing behavior?   
 
Individual centrality concept defines that individuals who are centrally embedded in a collective have a 
high probability of direct ties with other members. They have a richer social capital. Such members can 
exert more influence than others. They are more likely to cooperate with others and comply with group 
norms and expectations (Rogers and Kincaid 1981). 
 
Members who frequently shared their knowledge and have high Best Answer Ratio are core members of 
the community. Members with high Best Answer Ratio are more connected to other members and have 
developed the habit of cooperation.  They understand the efforts of sharing knowledge through their past 
experience. When they call for help from others, they tend to follow the sharing group norm and value the 
efforts of others. Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses: 
 
H4:  Members who shared their knowledge more frequently before will set high Reward Points when they 
post their own questions. 
H5:  Members who have high Best Answer Ratio will set high Reward Points when they post their own 
questions. 
 
To check H4 and H5, we use nonparametric tests to check the correlation between Reward Points and No. 
of Answers in History, and Best Answer Ratio. The results are reported in Table 4 and Table 5 
respectively. 
 
  Computer  Entertainment  Both Categories 
Pearson’s r 0.013 0.021* 0.006 
Spearman’s rho 0.064** 0.047* 0.000 
Kendall’s tau_b 0.051** 0.003 0.001 
Table 4.    Correlation between Reward Points and No. of Answers in History 
 
 Computer  Entertainment  Both Categories 
Pearson’s r 0.119*** 0.059* 0.089*** 
Spearman’s rho 0.073*** 0.023 0.026 
Kendall’s tau_b 0.059*** 0.19* 0.020 
Table 5.   Correlation between Reward Points and Best Answer Ratio 
 
The results show that Reward Points of questions in the Computer category are correlated with askers’ 
past behavior.  In that category, members who answer more questions, or Members whose answers are 
frequently adopted by others as the best answer tend to set high Reward Points for their question.  
Therefore, H4 and H5 are accepted in the Computer category, while the same can not be said about the 
Entertainment category.  
4. FREE RIDER BEHAVIOR 
To investigate free rider behavior, we classify members into askers and answerers. Askers are defined as 
those members in the sample who have asked at least one question. Answerers are defined as those 
members who have answered at least one question. Table 6 shows the cumulative percentage of 
members’ past No. of Answers in the Computers category. According to their past behavior, 38.4% of 
askers never answered questions. 63.1% of askers answered less than 10 questions before. In contrast, 
only 1.3% of answerers never answered question before and answered their first question in our sample. 
Also, only 9.3% of answerers answered less than 10 questions before. Further more, 87.4% askers 
answered less than 100 questions, while only 43.6% answerers answered less than 100 questions. 
 






0 (free riders) 38.4% 1.3% 
Less than 10 63.1% 9.3% 
Less than 100 87.4% 43.6% 
Less than 1000 99.2% 87.1% 
Table 6.    The Cumulative Distribution of Past No. of Answers in Computers Category 
 
In the Entertainment category, the results are quite similar. As shown in Table 7, 33.8% of the askers are 
free riders, while only 1.6% of the answerers are free riders. 
 
Past No. of Answers in 
Entertainment Category 
Askers’ Cumulative Percent Answerers’ Cumulative 
Percent 
0 33.8% 1.6% 
Less than 10 59.3% 13.1% 
Less than 100 87.4% 54.8% 
Less than 1000 98.8% 87.5% 
Table 7.    The Cumulative Distribution of Past No. of Answers in Entertainment category 
Such results clearly illustrate that askers show less willingness to help others compared with answerers. In 
both categories, askers show much less willingness to help than answerers.  Around 35% to 40% askers in 
both categories are free-riders, as they never answered questions before. Around 60% askers in both 
categories answered less than 10 questions before.  Although such members show more selfishness in 
contributing knowledge than others, it appears that they are actually the key factor to sustain the online 
community. They are active knowledge seekers and propose around 60% of questions. They value the 
answers from others and actively rate which one is the best. Because of the existence of such members, 
online community is able to sustain and prosper.  
 
The free rider phenomenon may also be viewed from a box-plot of user behavior. We collect past 
behavior of askers and answerers and examine how many times each member have shared their 
knowledge before. The box-plot of the Computer category [Figure 3] and the Entertainment category 
[Figure 4] clearly show that answerers usually shared knowledge more frequently than askers. Moreover, 
answerers have much more outliers compared with askers, indicating that more answerers are extremely 




















































Figure 4.   The Boxplot of the Entertainment Category 
Besides the free rider behavior associated with askers and answerers, many other non-registered free 
riders are not included in our sample. Baidu Knows is an open community, that attracts users who did not 
register at Baidu Knows, but still browse the questions and answers in seeking knowledge. Baidu Knows 
also gets routed traffic from the regular Baidu search engine. Since this type of free rider behavior does 
not leave any trace in the community, it is difficult to investigate their behavior and assess their 
population size. We did surveys in two undergraduate and three postgraduate classes in a well-established 
university in China.  All the students in these classes had visited Baidu Knows and browsed questions and 
answers.  However, only one tenth of them were registered members in Baidu Knows. Such simple 
survey results indicate that the proportion of free riders in the knowledge sharing communities is much 
larger than that reflected in our sample.  
5. QUALITY OF KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
Quality of shared knowledge is one of the key factors determining whether the community will be 
sustainable over the long run. Those members who share high quality knowledge are the most valuable 
resources of the community. Who will share high quality knowledge?  What are the characteristics of the 
members who share high quality knowledge? These are the questions we address in this section.  
 
The self-verification concept, rooted in cognitive dissonance theory, suggests that people are more 
satisfied and likely to participate in a relationship when their salient identities are confirmed by others in a 
group (Swann 1983, Swann et al. 1987). Members who shared high quality knowledge obviously have 
higher Best Answer Ratio. Their sharing behavior is acknowledged by others.  They will have a relatively 
high self verification than others and have higher motivation to help others in the future. Therefore, we 
suggest the following hypotheses: 
H6:  Members whose ratios of best answer are high will share knowledge more in the community. 
H7:  Members whose ratios of best answer are high will set high Reward Points for others. 
H8:  Answerers have higher ratios of best answer compared with askers. 
To investigate who are sharing high quality knowledge in the community, we use the following 
regression function to examine the relationship between quality of shared knowledge and members’ 
characteristics. 





























Table 8: The correlation between Best Answer Ratio and Reward Points 
The regression results show some interesting findings: first, members answered more questions shared 
high quality knowledge as well.  Second, members who shared high quality knowledge sent out more 
Reward Points, which means that they value others’ sharing behavior more. Third, compared with askers, 
answerers’ shared knowledge has high quality compared with askers’.   
 
Such results indicate that those answerers who frequently answer questions are the most valuable 
resources in the community. They not only answered most questions but answered with higher quality. 
Also, we may envision a positive circulation formed in the community. Answerers who share high quality 
knowledge will be acknowledged by others and have high Best Answer Ratio. In return, those members 
are motivated due to the acknowledgment by other members, and thus will answer more questions. 
Further more, since they understand the efforts involved in sharing knowledge, they will send out high 
Reward Points to others when they propose their questions.   
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper uses empirical data that we collected from a spider engine to investgate user profile, 
knowledge sharing motivations and quality of sharing knowledge in online communities.  We found two 
groups of people are extremely important in driving the growth of these communities. First, the top 
contributors unselfishly answer other questions, contributing their own knowledge. Among these people, 
there are approximatley 85% are pure contributors, seldom asking any questions. The second group of 
users are those who seldom answer questions, but always ask questions. Although their behavior seems 
selfish at the surface, they are actually the key factors driving the growth of online knowledge sharing 
communities. It is precisely because of these users’ questions that the online communities see reasons of 
existence.  
 
Majority of free riders appear to be those non-registered members outside our sample. In order to spur 
further growth, organizors of online knowledge sharing communities may think of ways to have these 
free riders join the community.  
 
We also investigated motivations of contributing knowledge. Although Reward Points and reciprocal-
supportiveness are clear factors explaining knowlege sharing behavior, there are also many members who 
do not care about rewards. Our conjecture is that these members derive satisfaction from helping others as 
a motivation of contributing knowledge.  
 
Unlike previous results, we found that members’ past behavior does not seem to be acknowledged by 
others. That is to say, those who have a history of helping others, do not seem to get above-average help 
from others when they need help. This may be because knowledge sharing communities are simply too 
large with too many members, and the bonding relationship seems to exist between members and the 
community itself, as opposed to between members. When users decide whether to answer a question, he 
may be more concerned about his relationship with the community, instead of the ID identity of the 
author of the question.  
 
We also found that the value of shared knowledge sees a positive correlation with past behavior. Those 
members who historically contributed a lot tend to award members higher who answer their questions. 
These people are also the core members driving the growth of online communities.  
 
Our study confirms the intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of knowledge contribution based on real 
member usage data, supplementing the survey methods that have been traditionally used in this type of 
studies. In future research, we plan to incorporate data from the Yahoo! Answers, to investigate different 
user behavior under the different reward mechanisms. We conjecture that there might be also different 
cultural factors in driving knowledge sharing behavior.  
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